📋 Korean Law Insight | Business Law / Foreign Investment
By Attorney NOH UJIN | HANBYOL LAW LLC, Seoul
Shareholder Rights and Activism in Korea for Foreign Institutional Investors
South Korea's capital markets have undergone significant transformation in recent years. The government's "Corporate Value-up Program" (기업 밸류업 프로그램), launched in 2024, directly echoes Japan's governance reforms and seeks to close the longstanding "Korea Discount"—the chronic undervaluation of Korean listed companies relative to global peers, largely attributed to weak shareholder protections and opaque chaebol governance. For foreign institutional investors, this transformation opens new avenues for engagement, but also requires a precise understanding of Korean corporate and securities law.
This guide examines the legal rights and practical strategies available to foreign shareholders in Korean listed companies, including exercise of voting rights, derivative suits, access to corporate information, mandatory tender offer obligations, and the growing role of Korea's stewardship code.
1. The Korea Discount and the Value-Up Program
Korean listed companies have historically traded at a significant discount to book value compared to counterparts in the US, Japan, and Europe. The primary causes identified by regulators and analysts include:
- Concentrated ownership structures dominated by founding family-controlled chaebols
- Cross-shareholdings and circular ownership that dilute minority shareholder returns
- Low dividend payout ratios and large corporate cash hoards
- Opaque related-party transactions benefiting controlling shareholders
- Weakly enforced minority shareholder rights
The Corporate Value-up Program (기업 밸류업 프로그램), rolled out by the Financial Services Commission (FSC) and Korea Exchange (KRX), encourages listed companies to voluntarily disclose capital efficiency improvement plans, set price-to-book ratio (PBR) targets, and enhance dividend policies. While initially voluntary, it signals a regulatory environment increasingly receptive to shareholder pressure.
2. Legal Framework: Korean Corporate Law for Shareholders
Shareholder rights in Korea are primarily governed by the Commercial Act (상법), the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (FSCMA, 자본시장법), and the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies (외부감사법). Key shareholder rights include:
2-1. Voting Rights
Each ordinary share carries one vote at the general shareholders' meeting (GSM). Shareholders holding at least 1% of total voting shares (or 0.5% for companies with capital above KRW 100 billion) may submit agenda items for the GSM. Korea permits proxy voting, and listed companies must accept electronic voting (전자투표) since 2014 for certain shareholder resolutions.
2-2. Cumulative Voting
The Commercial Act provides for cumulative voting (집중투표) for the election of directors, allowing minority shareholders to concentrate their votes to elect at least one director representative. However, many Korean companies have excluded cumulative voting via articles of incorporation amendments. Foreign investors advocating for board representation should verify whether the target company's articles permit cumulative voting.
2-3. Right to Demand Inspection of Books and Records
Under Article 466 of the Commercial Act, shareholders holding at least 3% of total issued shares (1% for listed companies under FSCMA Article 466-2) may demand to inspect the company's accounting books, records, and minutes of board meetings. This is a powerful tool for uncovering related-party transactions or governance irregularities.
2-4. Derivative Suits (주주대표소송)
Shareholders holding at least 1% of total shares (0.01% for large listed companies with paid-in capital above KRW 100 billion) may file a derivative suit on behalf of the company against directors or executives for breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of corporate assets, or self-dealing. The derivative suit mechanism has gained traction in Korea, with landmark cases involving chaebol affiliates. Foreign institutional investors holding above the threshold have standing to bring such claims.
2-5. Right to Demand Convening of General Meetings
Shareholders holding 3% or more of total voting shares may demand the convening of a special general shareholders' meeting. If the board fails to comply within four weeks, shareholders may petition the court for authorization to convene the meeting themselves.
2-6. Appraisal Rights (주식매수청구권)
Shareholders who object to major corporate transactions (mergers, spin-offs, asset sales) that require GSM approval may exercise appraisal rights (株式買受請求權) and demand that the company purchase their shares at fair value. The appraisal price is determined by negotiation or, failing that, by court-appointed appraisers. Foreign shareholders can exercise these rights under the same conditions as domestic shareholders.
3. Mandatory Tender Offer Rules
Under the FSCMA, any person who, through a single transaction or a series of transactions, acquires shares of a listed company such that the acquirer's aggregate holding exceeds 25% of total voting shares, or who acquires shares intending to acquire de facto control, must conduct a mandatory public tender offer (공개매수). This protects minority shareholders by ensuring equal treatment in change-of-control transactions.
Foreign institutional investors building activist positions should be aware that crossing the 25% threshold triggers mandatory tender offer obligations, and that the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) enforces these rules strictly.
4. Disclosure and Reporting Obligations for Large Shareholders
Foreign investors must comply with Korean securities law disclosure requirements:
- 5% Disclosure Rule (주요주주 보고): Investors whose aggregate holding reaches or exceeds 5% of a listed company's outstanding shares must report to the FSS and KRX within 5 business days. Any subsequent change of 1% or more must be reported within 5 business days.
- 10% Insider Status (내부자): Shareholders holding 10% or more are deemed "major shareholders" (주요주주) and are subject to short-swing profit disgorgement rules (단기매매차익 반환). Any profits made from buying and selling (or selling and buying) within any 6-month period must be returned to the company.
- Strategic Holding Declaration: The 5% filing requires disclosure of the purpose of holding (investment only vs. seeking management control). A change from "investment only" to "seeking control" triggers additional disclosure and can be a precursor to a formal tender offer.
5. Stewardship Code and Institutional Investor Engagement
Korea's Stewardship Code (한국 스튜어드십 코드), introduced in 2016 and updated in 2021, is a set of principles for institutional investors, particularly domestic pension funds and asset managers, encouraging them to exercise ownership rights actively and engage with investee companies on ESG and governance matters. Key provisions include:
- Adoption of a policy for monitoring and engaging with investee companies
- Voting on shareholder resolutions and disclosing voting records
- Escalation procedures when engagement is ineffective
- Conflict of interest management
While the Stewardship Code is voluntary for domestic institutions, the National Pension Service (NPS)—Korea's largest investor—has become increasingly active in opposing related-party transactions and demanding governance reforms. Foreign institutional investors can coordinate with the NPS and domestic asset managers to amplify engagement pressure.
6. Practical Shareholder Activism Strategies
Foreign institutional investors engaging in shareholder activism in Korea typically employ the following strategies:
- Private engagement: Requesting meetings with management and the board to discuss capital allocation, governance concerns, or strategic direction
- Proxy voting: Voting against management proposals on excessive executive compensation, related-party transactions, or anti-takeover defenses
- Public campaigns: Issuing open letters or filing shareholder proposals in the run-up to the GSM (agenda must be submitted at least 6 weeks before the meeting date)
- Derivative suits: Filing on behalf of the company against directors engaged in self-dealing or breach of duty
- Regulatory complaints: Filing complaints with the FSS or KFTC regarding securities law violations or unfair trade practices
7. Limitations and Practical Challenges
Despite progress, foreign activist shareholders face significant structural hurdles in Korea:
- Record date manipulation: Korean companies may set the record date for voting close to the meeting date, limiting proxy solicitation time
- Chaebol defenses: Complex cross-shareholding structures mean that founding families often retain control even with minority economic interests
- Board composition: Independent directors are legally required but often lack true independence due to social networks with management
- Language barriers: GSM notices, proxy materials, and financial statements are typically in Korean, requiring translation
- Regulatory uncertainty: Activist campaigns can attract FSS scrutiny and informal pressure from regulators aligned with incumbent management
8. Recent Developments: 2024–2026
The regulatory environment for shareholder activism in Korea has shifted meaningfully since 2024:
- The Commercial Act amendments (2024) strengthened duty of care for directors of holding companies toward subsidiaries' minority shareholders
- The Value-Up Program created a de facto expectation that companies will proactively engage with shareholders on capital efficiency
- The NPS disclosed its voting record fully for the first time in 2024, increasing transparency and enabling coordination
- Activist funds (both domestic and foreign) have achieved notable governance reforms at several mid-cap Korean companies in 2024–2025
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Q1: What is the minimum shareholding threshold to file a derivative suit in Korea?
For large listed companies with paid-in capital above KRW 100 billion, the threshold is 0.01% of total shares. For smaller listed companies, the threshold is 1%. These thresholds are significantly lower than in many other jurisdictions, making derivative suits a viable tool for institutional investors holding even small positions.
Q2: Can foreign shareholders vote at Korean GSMs without being physically present?
Yes. Listed companies must offer electronic voting (전자투표) and proxy voting. Foreign shareholders typically vote through their global custodians, which in turn vote through Korean sub-custodians via the Korea Securities Depository (KSD). The process requires setting up proxy instructions at least 5 business days before the meeting.
Q3: What happens if a Korean company ignores shareholder engagement?
Shareholders have multiple escalation options: filing shareholder proposals for the GSM, calling a special general meeting (if holding 3%+), filing derivative suits, submitting regulatory complaints to the FSS, or going public with an activist campaign. The most effective approach depends on the company's governance structure and the shareholding coalition that can be assembled.
Q4: Are mandatory tender offer rules triggered by derivatives or total return swaps?
Under the FSCMA, the mandatory tender offer threshold is calculated based on economically equivalent positions, not just legal ownership. Equity derivatives (total return swaps, equity-linked securities, put/call options that confer economic exposure) may be counted toward the threshold under FSS interpretive guidance. Foreign investors using synthetic positions should seek legal advice before crossing material thresholds.
Q5: How does the Korea Discount affect valuations, and is it closing?
The Korea Discount—historically representing a 30–50% discount to book value for Korean large-caps versus US/European peers—has partially narrowed since the Value-Up Program launched in 2024. The program has incentivized companies to announce buybacks, increase dividends, and publish capital efficiency plans. However, structural governance issues (chaebol cross-shareholdings, weak independent boards) remain, and the discount persists for many companies.
Q6: Can foreign shareholders access Korean board meeting minutes?
Shareholders holding 3%+ (or 1% for listed companies under FSCMA) may demand inspection of board meeting minutes and accounting books under Commercial Act Article 466. If the company refuses, shareholders can seek a court order compelling disclosure. This has been used by foreign activists to uncover related-party transactions and governance failures.
Q7: What are the tax implications of Korean share disposal for foreign institutional investors?
Capital gains tax on Korean-listed shares sold by foreign investors is generally exempt unless the investor holds 25%+ of the company or is a treaty-exempt entity. Dividends paid to foreign investors are subject to 20% withholding tax (reducible under tax treaty—e.g., 15% under Korea-US DTA, 10%–15% under Korea-EU DTAs). Short-swing profit disgorgement (10%+ shareholders) may complicate tax planning for activist positions.
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📋 韩国法律洞察 | 商法 / 外商投资
作者：NOH UJIN 律师 | HANBYOL LAW LLC，首尔
外资机构投资者在韩国的股东权利与维权行动指南
韩国资本市场近年来经历了深刻变革。2024年推出的"企业价值提升计划"（企業価値アップ프로그램）致力于缩小长期存在的"韩国折价"——韩国上市公司相对于全球同类公司长期处于低估状态，主要原因在于股东保护薄弱和财阀治理不透明。对于外资机构投资者而言，这一变革开辟了新的参与渠道，同时也要求对韩国公司法和证券法有精准的理解。
1. 韩国折价与价值提升计划
"企业价值提升计划"由金融服务委员会（FSC）和韩国交易所（KRX）推出，鼓励上市公司自愿披露资本效率改善计划、设定市净率（PBR）目标，并优化股息政策。这一政策信号表明监管环境对股东压力日益包容。
2. 法律框架：韩国股东权利
股东权利主要受《商法》、《金融投资服务及资本市场法》（FSCMA）和《股份公司外部审计法》约束。主要权利包括：
- 投票权：每股普通股对应一票。持有总股本至少1%（资本额超1000亿韩元的公司为0.5%）的股东可提交股东大会议案。
- 累积投票权：《商法》规定董事选举中可使用累积投票，但许多韩国公司已通过修改章程予以排除。
- 账簿查阅权：持有已发行股份3%以上（上市公司按FSCMA为1%）的股东可要求查阅会计账簿、记录和董事会会议记录。
- 股东代表诉讼：持有总股本1%以上（资本超1000亿韩元的大型上市公司为0.01%）的股东可代表公司对违反受信义务的董事提起诉讼。
- 要求召开股东大会：持有3%以上有表决权股份的股东可要求召开临时股东大会。
- 股份收购请求权：对重大公司交易（合并、分立、资产出售）持异议的股东可要求公司以公允价值回购其股份。
3. 强制公开要约收购规则
根据FSCMA，通过单笔或系列交易取得上市公司超过25%有表决权股份的收购方须发起强制公开要约收购，以确保控制权变更中对小股东的平等待遇。
4. 大股东披露义务
持股达到或超过5%时须在5个工作日内向金融监督院（FSS）和KRX报告；持股10%以上被视为"主要股东"，须遵守6个月内短线交易利润归还规定。
5. 尽职管理守则与机构投资者参与
韩国尽职管理守则（2016年推出，2021年修订）鼓励机构投资者积极行使所有权权利，积极参与被投资公司的ESG和治理事务。国民养老金公团（NPS）作为韩国最大的投资者，已在反对关联方交易和要求治理改革方面越来越活跃。
6. 实践中的股东维权策略
- 私下沟通：与管理层及董事会沟通资本配置、治理问题
- 代理投票：反对过高管理层薪酬、关联方交易或反收购措施
- 公开行动：发表公开信或提交股东议案
- 股东代表诉讼：针对自我交易或违反职责的董事提起诉讼
- 监管投诉：向FSS或KFTC举报证券法违规行为
常见问题解答（FAQ）
Q1：在韩国提起股东代表诉讼的最低持股比例是多少？
大型上市公司（实缴资本超1000亿韩元）的门槛为0.01%，小型上市公司为1%。这一门槛远低于许多其他司法管辖区，使机构投资者即使持有小仓位也具有起诉资格。
Q2：外国股东可以不亲自出席股东大会就行使表决权吗？
可以。上市公司须提供电子投票和代理投票。外国股东通常通过全球托管行、韩国子托管行和韩国证券存托机构（KSD）行使表决权。
Q3：韩国公司忽视股东沟通时如何应对？
可以通过提交股东大会议案、召集临时股东大会（持股3%以上）、提起代表诉讼、向FSS投诉或发起公开维权行动等方式进行升级。
Q4：强制要约收购义务是否适用于衍生工具或总收益互换？
根据FSCMA，强制要约收购门槛基于经济等效持仓计算，不仅限于法律所有权。使用合成仓位的外国投资者在超越重要门槛之前应寻求法律意见。
Q5：韩国折价是否正在缩小？
自2024年价值提升计划推出以来，韩国折价有所收窄，多家公司宣布回购、提高股息并发布资本效率计划。但财阀交叉持股和独立董事会薄弱等结构性治理问题依然存在，折价对许多公司仍持续。
Q6：外国股东可以查阅韩国公司董事会会议记录吗？
持股3%以上（上市公司为1%）的股东可依据《商法》第466条要求查阅董事会会议记录和会计账簿。公司拒绝时，股东可申请法院强制披露令。
Q7：外资机构投资者出售韩国股票的税务影响如何？
外资投资者出售韩国上市股票的资本利得通常免税（除非持股25%以上）。股息须缴纳20%预扣税（在税收协定下可降低，如韩美协定为15%）。持股10%以上者须遵守短线交易利润归还规定。
📌 官方参考资料
📚 相关文章
📋 韓国法律インサイト | 商法 / 外国投資
弁護士 NOH UJIN | HANBYOL LAW LLC、ソウル
韓国における外資機関投資家の株主権利とアクティビズム
韓国の資本市場は近年、大きな変革を遂げています。2024年に開始された「企業価値向上プログラム（기업 밸류업 프로그램）」は、長年続く「韓国ディスカウント」—主要国と比較した上場企業の慢性的な割安状態—の解消を目指しています。外資機関投資家にとって、この変革は新たな関与の機会を拓くとともに、韓国の会社法・証券法への精通が求められます。
1. 韓国ディスカウントと価値向上プログラム
企業価値向上プログラムは金融委員会（FSC）と韓国取引所（KRX）が推進し、上場企業に自発的な資本効率改善計画の開示、PBR目標の設定、配当政策の強化を促します。株主圧力に対してより開放的な規制環境を示すシグナルといえます。
2. 法的枠組み：韓国における株主権利
株主権利は主に「商法」「金融投資サービス及び資本市場法（FSCMA）」「株式会社外部監査法」により規定されます。主要な権利：
- 議決権：普通株1株につき1票。総議決権株式の1%以上（資本金1000億ウォン超の会社は0.5%以上）を保有する株主は株主総会の議題提案が可能。
- 累積投票制度：「商法」は取締役選任における累積投票を規定しているが、多くの韓国企業は定款変更により排除。
- 帳簿閲覧権：発行済株式の3%以上（上市企業はFSCMAに基づき1%）を保有する株主は会計帳簿・記録・取締役会議事録の閲覧請求が可能。
- 株主代表訴訟：大型上場企業（払込資本金1000億ウォン超）では0.01%、小型上場企業では1%の保有で代表訴訟が可能。
- 臨時株主総会招集請求権：総議決権株式の3%以上保有株主が可能。
- 株式買取請求権：合併・分割・資産売却など主要取引に反対する株主は公正価値での買取請求が可能。
3. 強制公開買付規制
FCSMAに基づき、上場企業の総議決権株式の25%を超える取得には強制公開買付（公開買付）の実施が義務付けられます。
4. 大株主の開示義務
持株比率が5%以上に達した場合、5営業日以内にFSSとKRXへの報告が必要。10%以上保有は「主要株主」とみなされ、6ヶ月以内の短期売買差益の返還義務が生じます。
5. スチュワードシップ・コードと機関投資家の関与
2016年導入（2021年改訂）の韓国スチュワードシップ・コードは機関投資家に議決権の積極的行使と被投資企業へのESG・ガバナンス面での関与を促します。国民年金公団（NPS）は関連当事者取引への反対やガバナンス改革要求でますます積極的になっています。
6. 実践的な株主アクティビズム戦略
- 非公開での経営陣・取締役会との対話
- 過度な役員報酬・関連当事者取引・買収防衛策への反対票
- 公開書簡の発行や株主提案（総会6週間前までに提出）
- 自己取引・義務違反取締役への代表訴訟
- FSS・KFTCへの規制当局への申告
よくある質問（FAQ）
Q1：韓国での株主代表訴訟の最低持株要件は？
払込資本金1000億ウォン超の大型上場企業は0.01%、小型上場企業は1%です。この閾値は多くの国より低く、小規模ポジションを持つ機関投資家でも訴訟が可能です。
Q2：外国株主は総会に出席せず議決権を行使できますか？
可能です。上市企業は電子投票と代理投票を提供しなければなりません。外国株主は通常、グローバルカストディアンおよびKSD経由で議決権を行使します。
Q3：韓国企業が株主との対話を無視した場合の対応策は？
株主提案の提出、臨時総会招集（3%以上保有時）、代表訴訟、FSSへの申告、または公開アクティビズムキャンペーンによる段階的なエスカレーションが有効です。
Q4：強制公開買付義務はデリバティブやTRSにも適用されますか？
FCSMAの閾値は経済的等価ポジションに基づいて計算されます。合成ポジションを使用する外国投資家は重要な閾値を越える前に法的助言を求めるべきです。
Q5：韓国ディスカウントは縮小していますか？
2024年の価値向上プログラム開始以来、一部縮小しています。しかし、財閥の持合い構造や独立取締役の形骸化といった構造的ガバナンス問題は依然として残り、多くの企業でディスカウントは続いています。
Q6：外国株主は韓国企業の取締役会議事録を閲覧できますか？
3%以上（上市企業は1%以上）の株主は「商法」第466条に基づき取締役会議事録と会計帳簿の閲覧を請求できます。企業が拒否した場合は裁判所への開示命令申請が可能です。
Q7：外資機関投資家による韓国株式売却の税務上の影響は？
外国投資家による韓国上場株式売却の資本利得は、25%以上の持株を保有しない限り通常免税です。配当には20%の源泉税が課されます（租税条約により軽減可能）。10%以上の株主は短期売買差益返還規定の対象となります。
📌 公式参考資料
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Por el Abogado NOH UJIN | HANBYOL LAW LLC, Seúl
Derechos de Accionistas y Activismo en Corea para Inversores Institucionales Extranjeros
El mercado de capitales de Corea del Sur ha experimentado una transformación significativa en los últimos años. El "Programa de Mejora del Valor Corporativo" (기업 밸류업 프로그램), lanzado en 2024, busca cerrar el persistente "descuento coreano" —la crónica infravaloración de las empresas coreanas cotizadas respecto a sus pares mundiales, atribuida principalmente a la débil protección de los accionistas y la opaca gobernanza de los chaebol. Para los inversores institucionales extranjeros, esta transformación abre nuevas vías de participación, pero exige un entendimiento preciso del derecho societario y de valores de Corea.
1. El Descuento Coreano y el Programa de Mejora del Valor
El Programa de Mejora del Valor Corporativo, impulsado por la Comisión de Servicios Financieros (FSC) y la Bolsa de Corea (KRX), anima a las empresas cotizadas a divulgar voluntariamente planes de mejora de la eficiencia del capital, establecer objetivos de ratio precio-libro (P/VL) y mejorar las políticas de dividendos. Señala un entorno regulatorio cada vez más receptivo a la presión de los accionistas.
2. Marco Legal: Derechos de Accionistas en Corea
Los derechos de los accionistas se rigen principalmente por el Código Comercial, la Ley de Servicios de Inversión Financiera y Mercados de Capitales (FSCMA) y la Ley de Auditoría Externa de Sociedades Anónimas. Derechos clave:
- Derechos de voto: Una acción ordinaria, un voto. Los accionistas con al menos el 1% pueden presentar puntos del orden del día para la JGA.
- Voto acumulativo: El Código Comercial prevé el voto acumulativo para la elección de directores, aunque muchas empresas coreanas lo han excluido mediante modificación estatutaria.
- Derecho a inspección de libros y registros: Accionistas con 3%+ (1% para cotizadas bajo FSCMA) pueden solicitar inspección de libros contables, registros y actas del consejo.
- Acción derivada (소송대표소송): Accionistas con 1%+ (0,01% para grandes cotizadas) pueden interponer demandas derivadas contra administradores por incumplimiento del deber fiduciario.
- Convocatoria de junta especial: Accionistas con 3%+ de acciones con voto pueden exigir la convocatoria.
- Derecho de separación (appraisal rights): Los accionistas que se opongan a transacciones corporativas importantes pueden exigir la compra de sus acciones a valor razonable.
3. Normas de OPA Obligatoria
Bajo la FSCMA, cualquier persona que adquiera más del 25% de las acciones con voto de una empresa cotizada debe lanzar una OPA obligatoria, garantizando el trato igualitario a los accionistas minoritarios en transacciones de cambio de control.
4. Obligaciones de Divulgación para Grandes Accionistas
La regla del 5% exige notificación al FSS y KRX en 5 días hábiles. Los accionistas con 10%+ son "accionistas principales" sujetos a restitución de ganancias por compraventa a corto plazo en períodos de 6 meses.
5. Código de Buen Gobierno e Inversores Institucionales
El Código de Buen Gobierno (Stewardship Code) coreano, introducido en 2016 y actualizado en 2021, promueve que los inversores institucionales ejerzan activamente los derechos de propiedad y se involucren con las empresas participadas en asuntos ESG y de gobernanza. El Fondo Nacional de Pensiones (NPS) se ha vuelto cada vez más activo en la oposición a transacciones con partes vinculadas y en la exigencia de reformas de gobernanza.
6. Estrategias Prácticas de Activismo Accionarial
- Interlocución privada con la dirección y el consejo
- Voto contra remuneraciones excesivas, operaciones con partes vinculadas o defensas anti-opas
- Campañas públicas y propuestas de accionistas
- Acciones derivadas contra administradores por autocontratación o incumplimiento de deberes
- Reclamaciones regulatorias ante la FSS o la KFTC
Preguntas Frecuentes (FAQ)
P1: ¿Cuál es el umbral mínimo de participación para interponer una acción derivada en Corea?
Para grandes cotizadas con capital desembolsado superior a 100.000 millones de wones, el umbral es del 0,01%; para cotizadas más pequeñas, del 1%. Este umbral es significativamente más bajo que en muchas otras jurisdicciones.
P2: ¿Pueden los accionistas extranjeros votar en las JGA sin estar presentes físicamente?
Sí. Las cotizadas deben ofrecer voto electrónico y delegación de voto. Los accionistas extranjeros votan habitualmente a través de sus depositarios globales y del KSD.
P3: ¿Qué opciones hay si una empresa coreana ignora el diálogo con los accionistas?
Propuestas de accionistas para la JGA, convocatoria de junta especial (con 3%+), acciones derivadas, reclamaciones a la FSS o campañas públicas de activismo.
P4: ¿La OPA obligatoria aplica a derivados o TRS?
El umbral de la OPA obligatoria se calcula sobre posiciones económicamente equivalentes, no solo sobre la titularidad legal. Los inversores con posiciones sintéticas deben obtener asesoría legal antes de superar umbrales relevantes.
P5: ¿Se está cerrando el descuento coreano?
Parcialmente desde 2024, con más empresas anunciando recompras y mejoras de dividendos. Sin embargo, los problemas estructurales de gobernanza (participaciones cruzadas de chaebol, consejos débiles) persisten en muchas empresas.
P6: ¿Pueden los accionistas extranjeros acceder a las actas del consejo de administración coreano?
Los accionistas con 3%+ (o 1% para cotizadas bajo FSCMA) pueden solicitar la inspección de actas y libros contables según el artículo 466 del Código Comercial. Ante la negativa de la empresa, pueden solicitar una orden judicial de divulgación.
P7: ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones fiscales de la venta de acciones coreanas para inversores institucionales extranjeros?
Las plusvalías de venta de acciones cotizadas generalmente están exentas (salvo que se posea 25%+). Los dividendos están sujetos a retención del 20% (reducible por convenio fiscal). Los accionistas con 10%+ deben devolver las ganancias por operaciones a corto plazo.
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